<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">
  <channel>
    <title>US · Julian Hinz</title>
    <link>https://julianhinz.com/topics/us/</link>
    <description>US by Julian Hinz.</description>
    <language>en</language>
    <managingEditor>mail@julianhinz.com (Julian Hinz)</managingEditor>
    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 18 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <atom:link href="https://julianhinz.com/topics/us/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
    <item>
      <title>Der EU-Binnenmarkt als Schutzschild: Wie Europa den Handelskrieg mit den USA abfedert</title>
      <link>https://julianhinz.com/research/binnenmarkt_schutzschild/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 18 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://julianhinz.com/research/binnenmarkt_schutzschild/</guid>
      <dc:creator>Gabriel Felbermayr</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Julian Hinz</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Sebastian Krantz</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Hendrik Mahlkow</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Joschka Wanner</dc:creator>
      <category>trade policy</category>
      <category>tariffs</category>
      <category>EU single market</category>
      <category>US</category>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Die USA haben 2025 umfassende Importzölle eingeführt, die Europa direkt treffen. Die Analyse zeigt: Der EU-Binnenmarkt wirkt als Schutzschild gegen diese externen Schocks. Die Integration der europäischen Güter- und Arbeitsmärkte halbiert die regionale Streuung der Wohlfahrtseffekte und schützt insbesondere die am stärksten exponierten Regionen.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Der durchschnittliche Wohlfahrtsverlust liegt bei rund 0,06 Prozent, während die Standardabweichung über die Regionen von 0,13 auf 0,06 Prozentpunkte sinkt. Der Binnenmarkt funktioniert damit als Risikoteilungsmechanismus, der regionale Ungleichheiten komprimiert — in Zeiten geoökonomischer Spannungen ist seine Vertiefung eine strategische Notwendigkeit.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Who Pays the Tariffs?</title>
      <link>https://julianhinz.com/research/who_pays_the_tariffs/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 29 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://julianhinz.com/research/who_pays_the_tariffs/</guid>
      <dc:creator>Anna Vorwig</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Hendrik Mahlkow</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Aaron Lohmann</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Julian Hinz</dc:creator>
      <category>tariffs</category>
      <category>prices</category>
      <category>US</category>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Working paper version of &lt;a href=&#34;/research/americas_own_goal/&#34;&gt;America&amp;rsquo;s Own Goal: Who Pays the Tariffs?&lt;/a&gt; — forthcoming.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>America’s Own Goal: Who Pays the Tariffs?</title>
      <link>https://julianhinz.com/research/americas_own_goal/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://julianhinz.com/research/americas_own_goal/</guid>
      <dc:creator>Anna Vorwig</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Hendrik Mahlkow</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Aaron Lohmann</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Julian Hinz</dc:creator>
      <category>trade policy</category>
      <category>tariffs</category>
      <category>prices</category>
      <category>US</category>
      <description>&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img src=&#34;eventstudy_india_exports_weekly_unitvalue.png&#34;
         alt=&#34;India exports to US: log(unit value)&#34;/&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;
            &lt;p&gt;India exports to US: log(unit value)&lt;/p&gt;
        &lt;/figcaption&gt;
&lt;/figure&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The 2025 US tariffs are an own goal: American importers and consumers bear nearly the entire cost. Foreign exporters absorb only about 4% of the tariff burden—the remaining 96% is passed through to US buyers. Using shipment-level data covering over 25 million transactions valued at nearly $4 trillion, we find near-complete pass-through of tariffs to US import prices. US customs revenue surged by approximately $200 billion in 2025—a tax paid almost entirely by Americans. Event studies around discrete tariff shocks on Brazil (50%) and India (25–50%) confirm: export prices did not decline. Trade volumes collapsed instead. Indian export customs data validates our findings: when facing US tariffs, Indian exporters maintained their prices and reduced shipments. They did not “eat” the tariff.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Tariffs Hit Differently: The Regional Impact of US Tariffs across Europe and the Role of the Single Market</title>
      <link>https://julianhinz.com/research/tariffs_hit_differently/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 12 Dec 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://julianhinz.com/research/tariffs_hit_differently/</guid>
      <dc:creator>Gabriel Felbermayr</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Julian Hinz</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Sebastian Krantz</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Hendrik Mahlkow</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Joschka Wanner</dc:creator>
      <category>economic geography</category>
      <category>input-output linkages</category>
      <category>trade policy</category>
      <category>tariffs</category>
      <category>EU single market</category>
      <category>US</category>
      <description>&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img src=&#34;map_labor_location_change.svg&#34;
         alt=&#34;Changes in labor location under U.S. tariff shocks.&#34;/&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;
            &lt;p&gt;Changes in labor location under U.S. tariff shocks.&lt;/p&gt;
        &lt;/figcaption&gt;
&lt;/figure&gt;

&lt;p&gt;We study how recent U.S. tariffs ripple through European regions and how the EU Single Market cushions these shocks. Using a regionalized inter-country input–output framework with labor mobility, we embed 288 European NUTS2 regions in a global production network and quantify the heterogeneous effects of U.S. import protection.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Our counterfactuals compare outcomes under an integrated versus a fragmented Europe. Integration allows firms and workers to substitute along intra-EU value chains, which substantially lowers both average income losses and the dispersion of outcomes across regions. The results highlight how deep integration shapes the geography of trade policy exposure.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Trumps Zölle: Chaotische Entkopplung</title>
      <link>https://julianhinz.com/research/trumps_zoelle_chaotische_entkopplung/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Apr 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://julianhinz.com/research/trumps_zoelle_chaotische_entkopplung/</guid>
      <dc:creator>Sonali Chowdhry</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Julian Hinz</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Hendrik Mahlkow</dc:creator>
      <category>trade policy</category>
      <category>tariffs</category>
      <category>decoupling</category>
      <category>US</category>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Die neue Welle US-amerikanischer Handelsbeschränkungen unterscheidet sich grundlegend von den Maßnahmen aus Trumps erster Amtszeit: Die Zölle sind höher, breiter angelegt und enthalten deutlich weniger Ausnahmen. Erwartet wurde eine weitere wirtschaftliche Entfernung der USA von China — die bisherigen Entscheidungen spiegeln jedoch eine weit radikalere und chaotische Abkehr der USA vom Welthandel insgesamt wider.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Für die EU sind die wirtschaftlichen Folgen erheblich: Simulationen zeigen, dass ein anhaltender transatlantischer Zollkrieg die EU-Exporte in die USA langfristig halbieren könnte. Die Last verteilt sich ungleich auf die Mitgliedstaaten — die Slowakei, Litauen und Österreich müssten langfristig mit den stärksten BIP-Rückgängen rechnen.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Consequences of the Trump Trade War for Europe</title>
      <link>https://julianhinz.com/research/trump_trade_war_europe/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Apr 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://julianhinz.com/research/trump_trade_war_europe/</guid>
      <dc:creator>Julian Hinz</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Isabelle Méjean</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Moritz Schularick</dc:creator>
      <category>KITE</category>
      <category>trade policy</category>
      <category>tariffs</category>
      <category>trade diversion</category>
      <category>US</category>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Using the KITE model suite, we study the economic costs of the Trump tariff policy for Europe, and analyze the potential for trade diversion from China. - If the current tariff regime stays in place, trade between the U.S. and China would fall dramatically, hurting mainly the U.S. and the Chinese economies. The direct economic impact for Europe appears limited. - The expected rerouting of Chinese and U.S. exports to third countries is likely to intensify competition between European and Chinese producers in key markets. European consumers stand to benefit from lower prices.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>US Trade Policy after 2024: What Is at Stake for Europe?</title>
      <link>https://julianhinz.com/research/us_trade_policy_after_2024/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Oct 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://julianhinz.com/research/us_trade_policy_after_2024/</guid>
      <dc:creator>Gabriel Felbermayr</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Julian Hinz</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Rolf J. Langhammer</dc:creator>
      <category>trade policy</category>
      <category>tariffs</category>
      <category>decoupling</category>
      <category>EU</category>
      <category>US</category>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Following the upcoming U.S. elections, the EU should prioritize defending the multilateral trade system, as a collapse in global economic cooperation could impact Europe up to four times more than direct U.S. tariffs alone. Potential U.S. trade policies under either a Harris or second Trump administration are expected to remain protectionist, though Harris would likely adopt a more multilateral stance, while Trump could intensify tariffs and weaken the WTO&amp;rsquo;s role. If the U.S. imposes broad tariffs-such as a 10% surcharge on imports and a 60% tariff on Chinese goods-global trade could shrink by 2.5% initially, with greater contractions if trade partners retaliate.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
