KITE · Julian Hinz

KITE

Julian Hinz — Fri, 09 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000

Open the KITE Lab → Shift a tariff and watch the world adjust: live results for 81 economies, computed in your browser.

KITE (Kiel Institute Trade Policy Evaluation) is an open-source framework for quantitative trade-policy counterfactuals. It implements general-equilibrium trade models in the New Quantitative Trade Model tradition and solves them in changes with exact hat algebra: given a baseline and a policy scenario (tariffs, non-tariff measures, carbon taxes), it returns the counterfactual changes in welfare, production, and trade flows.

The model has originally been developed by Caliendo & Parro (2015), building a multi-sector version of the Ricardian trade model of Eaton & Kortum (2002), where countries produce and sell domestically as well as internationally according to their relative comparative advantage. The model extends this framework by allowing for extensive intra- and international input-output linkages where goods and services may enter as both final and intermediate goods. Trade policy is conducted through the tightening or easing of trade barriers in form of tariffs and non-tariff measures.

KITE has been used to evaluate trade agreements (e.g. NAFTA, TTIP), trade disputes (e.g. the US–China trade war) and economic sanctions. It derives the economic consequences for production, value added and welfare based on pre-defined scenarios that specify the policies to be evaluated.

A detailed description of the framework is available in the white paper “The KITE Model Suite: A Quantitative Framework for International Trade Analysis” (with Hendrik Mahlkow and Joschka Wanner, KITE White Paper, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, 2025).

Version 26.10 (“Brisk Fehmarn”, October 2026) ships three models:

Caliendo, Lorenzo, and Fernando Parro. 2015. “Estimates of the Trade and Welfare Effects of NAFTA.” The Review of Economic Studies 82 (1): 1–44.
Sonali Chowdhry, Julian Hinz, Katrin Kamin and Joschka Wanner. 2024. “Brothers in arms: The value of coalitions in sanctions regimes.” Economic Policy 39 (118): 471–512.
Hendrik Mahlkow and Joschka Wanner. 2023. “The Carbon Footprint of Global Trade Imbalances." CESifo Working Paper 10729. Carbon tax in a climate club with border carbon adjustment and export rebates, new in this release.

The full KITE suite comprises 13 models, available on request via kite@kielinstitut.de.

KITE is licensed under GPL-3. Documentation is at kite-model.org/r/.

Install from GitHub via the remotes package:


install.packages("remotes")
remotes::install_github("julianhinz/KITE")

Diversifizieren, nicht reagieren: Europas neuer Weg in der Handelspolitik

Hendrik Mahlkow — Thu, 10 Apr 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Die neue Zollpolitik der USA konfrontiert die EU mit wachsender handelspolitischer Unsicherheit. Vor diesem Hintergrund analysiert dieser Research Brief drei Szenarien, mit denen die EU auf protektionistische Tendenzen reagieren kann: 1. ein sektorales Handelsabkommen mit den USA, 2. die Vertiefung bestehender Freihandelsabkommen und 3. der Abschluss neuer Freihandelsabkommen mit Partnern wie Indien, Australien oder dem Mercosur. Basierend auf Simulationen mit dem KITE-Modell zeigt sich: Während ein auf die USA beschränktes Abkommen kaum makroökonomische Effekte hat, führen sowohl Szenario 2 als auch Szenario 3 zu einem robusten BIP- und Exportwachstum – insbesondere in wissensintensiven Sektoren. Die stärksten Effekte ergeben sich jedoch aus einer Kombination beider Strategien, wobei der Effekt für Österreich etwas geringer ausfallen würde, da Österreichs Wirtschaftsstruktur stärker auf bestehende EU-Handelspartner und traditionelle Absatzmärkte ausgerichtet ist. Handelsdiversifizierung ist somit kein technisches Detail, sondern ein zentrales Instrument europäischer Resilienzpolitik.

The Consequences of the Trump Trade War for Europe

Julian Hinz — Tue, 01 Apr 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Using the KITE model suite, we study the economic costs of the Trump tariff policy for Europe, and analyze the potential for trade diversion from China. - If the current tariff regime stays in place, trade between the U.S. and China would fall dramatically, hurting mainly the U.S. and the Chinese economies. The direct economic impact for Europe appears limited. - The expected rerouting of Chinese and U.S. exports to third countries is likely to intensify competition between European and Chinese producers in key markets. European consumers stand to benefit from lower prices.

Time to Be Open, Sustainable, and Assertive: Tariffs on Chinese BEVs and Retaliatory Measures

Gabriel Felbermayr — Mon, 01 Jul 2024 00:00:00 +0000

From 4 July, the EU will impose provisional countervailing tariffs of 21% on battery electric vehicles (BEVs) imported from China. It is the last large market - and in itself largest export market - to impose new substantial trade barriers against Chinese BEVs. According to simulations of a large-scale trade model (KITE model), this measure raises the car prices in the EU and lowers them in China in the long-run. Yet, the effects are small. Short-term effects are likely to be larger. Car imports from China are expected to fall by 42%, but this effect is largely offset by diversion of European sales to domestic markets and higher imports from other third markets. EU car exports are only marginally affected. Value added in the EU’s car industry rises by 0.4%, while it falls by 0.6% in China. In most EU countries, welfare increases, but by less than 1/100th of a percentage point.

Coalitions for Sanctions Heighten Costs for Russia but Burden of Implementation Should Be Shared among Member Countries

Sonali Chowdhry — Thu, 01 Feb 2024 00:00:00 +0000

Countries increasingly form alliances to collectively impose sanctions. However, the resulting impact of such coordination remains unclear. Analyzing the 2014 wave of sanctions against Russia over 400,000 simulations with a quantitative trade model, this report demonstrates that multilateral cooperation through coalitions simultaneously reduced domestic welfare losses incurred from sanctions and intensified welfare losses imposed on Russia. Results also reveal significant disparities within the coalition, with Russia sanctions placing relatively high economic costs on Baltic nations that can be mitigated through a burden-sharing program. Hypothetical cooperation by emerging economies like China is also shown to substantially raise the force of sanctions against Russia.

The research behind this report is Brothers in Arms: The Value of Coalitions in Sanctions Regimes.