EU · Julian Hinz

Competing with China in Third Markets

Sonali Chowdhry — Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000

China’s export growth is increasingly concentrated in advanced manufacturing sectors, but the loss of European market shares in third markets is not explained by Chinese competition alone. Germany, France, and other European economies have also lost ground to competitors outside China in many markets.

The brief argues against broad tariffs as the default response to Chinese competition. Instead, durable competitiveness requires investment in innovation and new technology. Where sectoral safeguards are considered, they should be justified by strategic or security concerns or clear evidence of unfair trade practices, and temporary protection should include sunset clauses.

A Critical-Inputs Playbook: What the Strait of Hormuz Tells Europe

Julian Hinz — Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000

Europe imports only about 4% of its crude oil and 7% of its liquefied natural gas through the Strait of Hormuz. By those measures, the strait’s near-closure since the outbreak of war in February 2026 should barely register in European macro forecasts. Yet the European Central Bank cut its 2026 growth projection by 0.3 percentage points and raised its inflation projection by 0.7 points.

The column traces this discrepancy to a tug-of-war between a bottleneck amplifier and a substitution attenuator: while Europe’s post-2022 energy diversification cushions the direct shock, vulnerabilities persist in critical inputs such as nitrogen fertilizers, jet fuel and petrochemicals, where substitution is slow or nonexistent. What Europe needs is not another energy-crisis playbook but a critical-inputs playbook — serious monitoring and stress testing, strategic reserves for the few inputs that matter most, and a trade and industrial policy that treats chokepoint exposure as a primary parameter.

The Ukraine Support Tariff: How Europe Can Support Ukraine and Weaken Russia

Julian Hinz — Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000

A Ukraine Support Tariff on remaining EU–Russia trade would raise revenue for Ukraine while increasing pressure on Russia. The brief studies a combined import tariff and export-side levy on EU–Russia trade and evaluates revenue and welfare effects in partial and general equilibrium.

At moderate tariff rates of 30–50%, the proposal could generate revenue that exceeds annual proceeds from frozen Russian asset interest income. General equilibrium simulations show asymmetric leverage: Russia’s value added falls several times more than the EU’s, while trade diversion to China remains modest. Very high tariff rates would be counterproductive because long-run revenue would collapse.

The EU–India Trade Deal: Strategic Diversification in an Era of Uncertainty

Julian Hinz — Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000

The brief studies an EU–India free trade agreement as a strategic diversification tool in a more uncertain trade environment. Simulations point to mutual welfare gains, substantially higher bilateral trade, and a meaningful reallocation of trade away from China.

For India, the agreement provides a hedge against US tariff pressure. For the EU, it supports de-risking and signals a commitment to open trade. The structural benefits are framed as a long-term partnership rather than a temporary response to current policy shocks.

Prinzipien für eine europäische Industrie- und Handelspolitik für das geoökonomische Zeitalter

Julian Hinz — Mon, 01 Sep 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Diversifizieren, nicht reagieren: Europas neuer Weg in der Handelspolitik

Hendrik Mahlkow — Thu, 10 Apr 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Die neue Zollpolitik der USA konfrontiert die EU mit wachsender handelspolitischer Unsicherheit. Vor diesem Hintergrund analysiert dieser Research Brief drei Szenarien, mit denen die EU auf protektionistische Tendenzen reagieren kann: 1. ein sektorales Handelsabkommen mit den USA, 2. die Vertiefung bestehender Freihandelsabkommen und 3. der Abschluss neuer Freihandelsabkommen mit Partnern wie Indien, Australien oder dem Mercosur. Basierend auf Simulationen mit dem KITE-Modell zeigt sich: Während ein auf die USA beschränktes Abkommen kaum makroökonomische Effekte hat, führen sowohl Szenario 2 als auch Szenario 3 zu einem robusten BIP- und Exportwachstum – insbesondere in wissensintensiven Sektoren. Die stärksten Effekte ergeben sich jedoch aus einer Kombination beider Strategien, wobei der Effekt für Österreich etwas geringer ausfallen würde, da Österreichs Wirtschaftsstruktur stärker auf bestehende EU-Handelspartner und traditionelle Absatzmärkte ausgerichtet ist. Handelsdiversifizierung ist somit kein technisches Detail, sondern ein zentrales Instrument europäischer Resilienzpolitik.

Dealing with Global Economic Challenges: An Agenda for the New Federal Government

Frank Bickenbach — Sat, 01 Feb 2025 00:00:00 +0000

An agenda for the new German federal government on the major global economic challenges. Germany must once again see itself as an important part of and a leading nation within the EU: completing the single market for digital products, financial services, and energy is the precondition for competing with the USA and China. Vis-à-vis China, the EU should reject compromise solutions such as minimum prices for electric vehicles and instead demand a reduction of unfair subsidies and better protection of European companies. Announced US tariffs threaten substantial losses for German exports; Europe should respond with unified countermeasures and higher defense investment. Beyond that, the brief argues for concluding trade agreements with regional partners, a strategic Africa policy built on long-term partnerships rather than migration deterrence, systematic monitoring of critical raw-material supply chains, and swift implementation of the EU emissions trading system.

US Trade Policy after 2024: What Is at Stake for Europe?

Gabriel Felbermayr — Tue, 01 Oct 2024 00:00:00 +0000

Following the upcoming U.S. elections, the EU should prioritize defending the multilateral trade system, as a collapse in global economic cooperation could impact Europe up to four times more than direct U.S. tariffs alone. Potential U.S. trade policies under either a Harris or second Trump administration are expected to remain protectionist, though Harris would likely adopt a more multilateral stance, while Trump could intensify tariffs and weaken the WTO’s role. If the U.S. imposes broad tariffs-such as a 10% surcharge on imports and a 60% tariff on Chinese goods-global trade could shrink by 2.5% initially, with greater contractions if trade partners retaliate.

Time to Be Open, Sustainable, and Assertive: Tariffs on Chinese BEVs and Retaliatory Measures

Gabriel Felbermayr — Mon, 01 Jul 2024 00:00:00 +0000

From 4 July, the EU will impose provisional countervailing tariffs of 21% on battery electric vehicles (BEVs) imported from China. It is the last large market - and in itself largest export market - to impose new substantial trade barriers against Chinese BEVs. According to simulations of a large-scale trade model (KITE model), this measure raises the car prices in the EU and lowers them in China in the long-run. Yet, the effects are small. Short-term effects are likely to be larger. Car imports from China are expected to fall by 42%, but this effect is largely offset by diversion of European sales to domestic markets and higher imports from other third markets. EU car exports are only marginally affected. Value added in the EU’s car industry rises by 0.4%, while it falls by 0.6% in China. In most EU countries, welfare increases, but by less than 1/100th of a percentage point.

An Analysis of the Implementation of the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)

Julian Hinz — Wed, 01 Nov 2023 00:00:00 +0000

This in-depth analysis offers a quantitative analysis of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada, six years after its provisional enforcement. Our analysis confirms substantial economic gains: goods exports from the EU to Canada increased by 27 % and imports rose by 32 % due to the agreement. The services sector also showed robust growth, with 19 % and 15 % increases in exports and imports, respectively. However, the paper identifies challenges, such as the low Preference Utilization Rate (PUR), predominantly among large firms, and highlights that SMEs still account for less than half of the EU’s total exports to Canada. Beyond the immediate economic impact, the analysis focuses on key issues in the implementation and offers further quantitative evidence on critical raw material policies and mutual recognition agreements.

The Brussels Effect 2.0: How the EU Sets Global Standards with Its Trade Policy

Elisabeth Christen — Sat, 01 Oct 2022 00:00:00 +0000

The creation of uniform, legally binding norms and standards is an essential basis for the functioning of the EU single market, which at the same time is increasingly spread beyond the EU’s borders through international trade relations. The shaping of global standards and regulations according to EU directives even beyond the EU’s borders represents an important competitive advantage of the EU. The EU also manages to impose rules, regulations and standards only through market mechanisms in third countries without international treaties or agreements. This has in many areas contributed to the “Europeanisation” of important aspects of global trade. In the academic literature, this regulatory influence of the EU is defined as the “Brussels Effect”. The focus of this study is to give a comprehensive overview of the Brussels Effect and to analyse the linkages regarding EU trade policy, outlining to what extent a Brussels Effect can be observed in the network of EU trade agreements. Based on a comprehensive and broad identification of the Brussels Effect, this study aims to quantify the trade effects in terms of the leading role in shaping global standards and regulations for the EU and Austria and to qualitatively identify further areas in which untapped potentials of a “Brussels Effect 2.0” seem possible in the context of EU trade policy.

Potential Economic Benefits of the African Continental Free Trade Area for Africa and the EU

Julian Hinz — Sat, 01 Jan 2022 00:00:00 +0000

Despite some growth, intra-African trade activity remains at low levels and falls far behind the levels of internal trade observed in more integrated regions like the EU. The European continent remains a major trading partner, but its share in total African exports and imports has decreased from nearly 50% to 35% between 2000 and 2020. Our simulations suggest that implementing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement can lead to substantial welfare gains in Africa, but only if tariff reductions are accompanied by a significant lowering of Non-Tariff-Barriers (NTBs). If NTBs are reduced on a multilateral basis, the EU’s declining trade share with Africa might also be reversed. European governments and EU institutions should therefore have an incentive to provide technical and financial assistance — possibly within the framework of the existing WTO-led aid-for-trade initiative — to help AfCFTA economies lowering NTBs on a multilateral basis.

Perspektiven einer erfolgreichen europäischen Handelspolitik im Kontext geopolitischer Herausforderungen

Julian Hinz — Sat, 15 May 2021 00:00:00 +0000

Russia’s and the EU’s Sanctions. Economic and Trade Effects, Compliance and the Way Forward

Elisabeth Christen — Fri, 15 Sep 2017 00:00:00 +0000

Auswirkungen der Wirtschaftssanktionen der EU und Russlands auf Wertschöpfung und Beschäftigung in Österreich und der EU

Julian Hinz — Thu, 15 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000