China · Julian Hinz

Competing with China in Third Markets

Sonali Chowdhry — Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000

China’s export growth is increasingly concentrated in advanced manufacturing sectors, but the loss of European market shares in third markets is not explained by Chinese competition alone. Germany, France, and other European economies have also lost ground to competitors outside China in many markets.

The brief argues against broad tariffs as the default response to Chinese competition. Instead, durable competitiveness requires investment in innovation and new technology. Where sectoral safeguards are considered, they should be justified by strategic or security concerns or clear evidence of unfair trade practices, and temporary protection should include sunset clauses.

Time to Be Open, Sustainable, and Assertive: Tariffs on Chinese BEVs and Retaliatory Measures

Gabriel Felbermayr — Mon, 01 Jul 2024 00:00:00 +0000

From 4 July, the EU will impose provisional countervailing tariffs of 21% on battery electric vehicles (BEVs) imported from China. It is the last large market - and in itself largest export market - to impose new substantial trade barriers against Chinese BEVs. According to simulations of a large-scale trade model (KITE model), this measure raises the car prices in the EU and lowers them in China in the long-run. Yet, the effects are small. Short-term effects are likely to be larger. Car imports from China are expected to fall by 42%, but this effect is largely offset by diversion of European sales to domestic markets and higher imports from other third markets. EU car exports are only marginally affected. Value added in the EU’s car industry rises by 0.4%, while it falls by 0.6% in China. In most EU countries, welfare increases, but by less than 1/100th of a percentage point.

What if? The Effects of a Hard Decoupling from China on the German Economy

David Baqaee — Mon, 15 Apr 2024 00:00:00 +0000

Cold turkey decoupling vs. gradual decoupling vs. gradual de-risking.

How would the German economy cope with a hard economic decoupling from China? We study a scenario where the global economy fragments into three distinct blocs: the G7 economies and their allies, China and her allies, as well as neutral countries. German trade with China would have to be entirely rerouted to countries within the “Western” block and neutral countries. We quantify the costs of such a worst-case hard decoupling using the Baqaee and Farhi (2021) multi-sector model of the world economy. Our key finding is that a total cut-off of trade relations with China would have severe but not devastating effects on the German economy. The welfare loss for Germany (relative to a no-cut-off baseline) would be around 5% of Gross National Expenditure (GNE) over the first few months and around 4% over the first year, plus additional short run costs due to business-cycle amplification effects. In the medium and long run, the costs would fall to a permanent loss in the 1-2% range. Less extreme decoupling or gradual de-risking scenarios (“small yard, high fence”) would incur smaller costs. The single most influential assumption relates to the “trade elasticity,” i.e., the ease and speed with which trade can be reorganized away from China to neutral countries and within the “Western” block. Our findings, in particular the critical dependence of economic costs on the time horizon over which adjustments take place, provide some rationale for embarking on a gradual de-risking trajectory to avoid a costly and politically contentious hard decoupling dictated by geopolitical events.

Was wäre wenn? Die Auswirkungen einer harten Abkopplung von China auf die deutsche Wirtschaft

David Baqaee — Mon, 01 Jan 2024 00:00:00 +0000

Wie würde die deutsche Wirtschaft eine harte wirtschaftliche Abkopplung von China bewältigen? Um dem nachzugehen, simulieren die Autoren mithilfe eines quantitativen Handelsmodels ein Szenario, in dem sich die Weltwirtschaft in drei Blöcke aufspaltet: die G7-Staaten und ihre Verbündeten, China mit seinen Verbündeten sowie neutrale Länder. Der Handel Deutschlands mit China müsste komplett auf Länder des “westlichen” Blocks und neutrale Staaten umgeleitet werden. Die Kosten einer solchen worst-case harten Entkopplung quantifizieren die Autoren mit dem Multisektor-Modell der Weltwirtschaft von Baqaee und Farhi (2021). Die zentrale Erkenntnis der Autoren ist, dass ein vollständiger Abbruch der Handelsbeziehungen mit China schwerwiegende, aber nicht katastrophale Auswirkungen auf die deutsche Wirtschaft haben würde.

An English version is What if? The Effects of a Hard Decoupling from China on the German Economy.