Brothers in arms: The value of coalitions in sanctions regimes — Online Appendix

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


Figure 1: Individual contributions — Iran sanctions

Note: Figures above display each country in the current sanctions coalition against Iran and the welfare change it experiences domestically and that which it imposes on the sanctioned state. The 95% confidence intervals on welfare losses are constructed from 1000 bootstrap replications of the simulations.




Figure 2: Individual contributions — Russia sanctions

Note: Figures above display each country in the current sanctions coalition against Russia and the welfare change it experiences domestically and which it imposes on the sanctioned state. The 95% confidence intervals on welfare losses are constructed from 1000 bootstrap replications of the simulations.




Figure 3: New coalition partners: Welfare loss imposed on Iran

Note: The map above displays the additional welfare loss incurred by Iran from each new country joining the current sanctions coalition. Countries in grey correspond to those which already sanction Iran.




Figure 4: New coalition partners: Welfare loss imposed on Russia

Note: The map above displays the additional welfare loss incurred by Russia from each new country joining the current sanctions coalition. Countries which already sanction Russia are depicted in dark grey whereas countries in light grey correspond to those, whose membership in the coalition causes Russian welfare loss to marginally reduce.




Figure 5: Burden sharing through transfers — Iran sanctions

Note: Figures above display each country in the sanctions coalition against Iran in 2012 and the transfers it sends or receives such that welfare losses are equalized across coalition members. The 95% confidence intervals are constructed from 1000 bootstrap replications of the simulations.




Figure 6: Burden sharing through transfers — Russia sanctions

Note: Figures above display each country in the sanctions coalition against Russia in 2014 and the transfers it sends or receives such that welfare losses are equalized across coalition members. The 95% confidence intervals are constructed from 1000 bootstrap replications of the simulations.