

Online appendix for

“Blowback: The Effect of Sanctions  
on Democratic Elections”

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today

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# 1 Descriptive statistics

**Table T.1: Summary Statistics**


Municipalities Products Destinations	All	Exporting			
		Embargoed Russia	Embargoed All	All Russia	All All
Number of cities	30910	172	1646	1860	9739
% of cities	100	0.56	5.32	6.01	31.5
% of Population	100	9.58	41.45	47.46	80.47
% of Registered voters	100	8.51	38.07	43.59	78.28
Unweighted Averages					
Population	2,066.4	35,594.9	16,085.5	16,300.4	5,278.3
Density (pop/km <sup>2</sup> )	182.7	1,293.2	1,053.9	1,219.1	445.1
Median income	20,922.1	20,522.5	21,274.1	2,1492.5	21,555.6
Unemployment rate	10.8	13.3	12.8	12.9	11.4
Share population above 65	20.7	20.8	20.6	19.7	20.6
Share non-native population	4.2	6.5	7.2	7.6	5.3
Share farm workers	5.1	1.9	2.0	1.4	2.9
Share low skilled jobs	45.9	44.2	43.6	43.4	44.9
Share high skilled jobs	16.6	18.3	19.2	19.4	18.3
2017 Abstention Rate	19.0	21.2	21.2	21.7	20.01
2017 % Macron	20.4	24.8	23.5	23.4	21.8
2017 % Le Pen	26.4	20.9	22.2	22.7	24.8
2017 % Fillon	19.9	19.0	20.0	19.8	20.1
2017 % Mélenchon	17.3	19.6	19.0	19.0	17.8
2017 % Hamon	5.2	6.9	6.1	5.9	5.4
2017 % Dupont-Aignan	5.8	4.7	5.0	5.1	5.6
2017 % Lassale	2.0	1.3	1.4	1.1	1.5
2017 % Poutou	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.2
2017 % Asselineau	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9
2017 % Arthaud	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7
2017 % Cheminade	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2

## 2 Check of the study sample and pre-trend analysis

This section describes the characteristics of our samples of municipalities to verify that the results are not simply due to the initial pattern of socio-economic structures or political in the treated cities.

The figures F.1 and F.2 show the kernel distributions of key characteristics for the municipalities in our treated and untreated groups. For each variable, the distribution for the group of treated cities is compared with the distributions obtained for all municipalities in mainland France, and for the smaller group of municipalities hosting firms that export embargoed products, but not to Russia (all variables are expressed as deviations from the departmental average). Each figure show also the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of the distributions for the latter group and the one of treated municipalities, with the corresponding p-value in parentheses.

**Figure F.1: Distribution of municipalities' characteristics**



**Figure F.2: Distribution of municipalities' electoral results (Presidential election 2012)**




Figure F.1 focuses on economic and social characteristics of the cities in 2011, i.e. the year before the first election considered in our empirical analysis. Cities exporting embargoed goods (to Russia or not) are quite different from the whole sample of French municipalities. Whereas France has a very large number of very small villages, the municipalities that host exporting firms – unsurprisingly – are a little larger and have a higher proportion of unemployed or foreign-born population. But it is reassuring to see that the characteristics of our treated municipalities do not differ substantially from those that also export embargoed products but not to Russia. The distributions for the two groups are very similar and not statistically different, except for the share of the population under 25 (at the 10% threshold only).

Even more reassuringly, Figure F.2 shows that initial electoral preferences in the treated cities were not measurably different from those in the control group. The figure compares the distributions of 2012 election results in municipalities exporting embargoed goods to Russia with those exporting the same goods to other countries. The distributions of votes for Le Pen or Dupont-Aignan are not statistically different from a group to the other. The same applies to abstention rates and the main candidates in the 2012 election (for François Hollande, however, the p-value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is 0.098, slightly below the 10% significance level).

In addition to the similarity of the initial conditions in the treated and control groups, we need to ensure that the parallel trend hypothesis holds. One may be concerned, for instance, that voter support for the *Front National* was, prior to 2012, on a particularly favorable trend in municipalities exporting embargoed goods to Russia. Addressing this concern is challenging. The political climate, campaign platforms, and voter interests are constantly evolving, making it difficult to compare elections over long periods. This is particularly true for the *Front National*. When Marine Le Pen succeeded her father at the head of the party in 2011, she initiated a profound change in electoral strategy. By developing new campaign themes and avoiding verbal provocations, she has attracted a much broader electorate (attracting more young voters, the middle classes and women). Marine Le Pen's *Front National* is very different from the one before 2011 and this is why we have only included the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections in our main analysis.


It is nevertheless possible to observe the evolution of votes for *Front National* candidates over a longer period.<sup>1</sup> We collect vote shares for Le Pen's party in 9 presidential, regional and European elections, starting with the 2002 presidential election.<sup>2</sup> For each municipality, we compute the percentage point changes in votes shares from one election to the next, and regress them on a full set of interactions between years fixed effects and

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<sup>1</sup>This analysis cannot be carried out for Dupont-Aignan's party. "Debout la France" was founded in 2014 and has not fielded candidates in all constituencies in the subsequent regional and European elections.

<sup>2</sup>The *Front National* candidate in the 2002 and 2007 presidential elections was Marine Le Pen's father, Jean-Marie Le Pen.

**Figure F.3: Pre-trend analysis**



*Notes:* The graph plots the coefficients on interactions between years dummies and the treatment group dummy (i.e. municipalities that export embargoed products to Russia in 2014-2015). Dependent variable: Variation in vote shares for *Front national* candidates, in each commune, from one election to the next. Fixed effects: Year-department. Sample: Municipalities exporting embargoed products. Reference year: 2002 presidential election.

the dummy variable characterizing our treated municipalities. Figure F.3 displays the estimated coefficients on these interaction terms. The sample is limited to cities exporting embargoed products and the specification includes year-department fixed effects.<sup>3</sup>

None of the estimated coefficients, except the last one corresponding to the evolution of votes between the 2015 regional elections and the 2017 presidential elections, are significantly different from zero. This supports the parallel trends assumption: The long-term trend in voting for the far-right party was not significantly different in the treatment group and comparable cities until the issue of Russian sanctions emerged as a major topic of public debate nationwide, in 2017.

### 3 Robustness checks

This section presents a series of additional robustness tests.

Table T.2 looks at the sensitivity of the results for Marine Le Pen to the presence of outliers

<sup>3</sup>The results are very similar when using year-employment zone or year-region fixed effects

**Table T.2:** Robustness check: Excluding one geographical zones at a time

Dep. var.	$\Delta$ Share of votes for Le Pen (2017-2012)							
	Treated cities		Employment zones		Departments		Regions	
	(1) Min	(2) Max	(3) Min	(4) Max	(5) Min	(6) Max	(7) Min	(8) Max
Export Embargoed products to Russia	0.495b (0.200)	0.562a (0.201)	0.492b (0.202)	0.598a (0.199)	0.469ab (0.203)	0.612a (0.206)	0.443b (0.221)	0.660a (0.237)

*Notes:* The specification is the same as in table 1. Columns (1) and (2): Min and max coefficients obtained from 172 regressions where each city in the treated group is dropped in turn. Columns (3) and (4): Min and max coefficients obtained from 297 regressions where each employment zone is dropped at in turn. Columns (5) and (6): Min and max coefficients obtained from 94 regressions where each department zone is dropped in turn. Columns (7) and (8): Min and max coefficients obtained from 12 regressions where each region zone is dropped in turn. Employment zone fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the employment zone level appear in parentheses. <sup>a</sup> and <sup>b</sup> indicate significance at the 1% and 5% confidence level respectively.

in the geographical areas considered. For this, we estimate the specification in table 1 - column 1, on samples that exclude one treated municipality at a time. The minimum and maximum of the various regression estimates for our treatment variable are shown in columns 1 and 2 respectively. Both coefficients are very close to our baseline result obtained on the whole sample of treated municipalities. In a similar vein, columns 3 through 8 verify that our results hold when we exclude observations from one employment zone, one department, or one region at a time. Again, the estimates confirm that our main result is not driven by a specific geographic location.

**Table T.3:** Lagged dependant variable model

	Round 1							Round 2
	Le Pen	Dupont Aignan	Mélenchon	Fillon	Macron	Hamon	Abstention	Le Pen
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Export Embargoed Products to Russia	0.489a (0.165)	0.144b (0.073)	-0.105 (0.155)	-0.003c (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.182 (0.167)	0.667a (0.245)
Export Embargoed Products	-0.277a (0.058)	-0.125a (0.038)	-0.026 (0.069)	0.003a (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001a (0.000)	0.213a (0.073)	-0.350a (0.090)
Export Any Product to Russia	-0.326a (0.069)	-0.132a (0.038)	-0.010 (0.057)	0.002a (0.001)	0.001b (0.001)	0.001 (0.000)	0.411a (0.070)	-0.498a (0.090)
Export Any Product	-0.145a (0.046)	-0.040 (0.026)	-0.019 (0.039)	0.002a (0.000)	0.001c (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.136a (0.047)	-0.244a (0.063)
Observations	30910	30910	30910	30910	30910	30910	30910	30910
$R^2$	0.727	0.145	0.614	0.709	0.456	0.275	0.471	0.724

*Notes:* The dependent variables are the shares of votes cast for the candidate in 2017 (as a proportion of total votes cast), except in (column 7) where it is the number of abstentions out of the number of people on the electoral roll. Control variables: all electoral results in 2012 presidential election and 2015 regional election, and city-level controls as in table 1 but in 2016 levels. Employment zone fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the employment zone level appear in parentheses. <sup>a</sup>, <sup>b</sup>, <sup>c</sup> and <sup>d</sup> indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 12% confidence level respectively.

Table T.3 replicates Table 1, but reports the estimates of the lagged dependent variable specification (LDV) – the results for Le Pen are also shown in table 2 of the paper. Here, unobserved preconditions are not taken into account by a first difference. Instead, we control for each municipality's pre-existing political situation using a vector of variables that includes the city's previous electoral results. The specification is thus a cross-section

for the year 2017. It includes fixed effects for employment zones and a large set of control variables. The latter include city characteristics (as in Table 1, but in 2016 levels instead of first differences) and all vote shares for each candidate in the 2012 presidential election. We also include the 2015 regional election results.

In the paper, Table 3 shows how the estimated impact on Marine Le Pen’s electoral results varies with the intensity of the treatment. Table T.4 replicates this table for Dupont-Aignan. While our baseline estimates suggested that the embargo had only a limited influence on Dupont-Aignan’s results, we can see here that the votes for this other pro-Russian candidate were boosted significantly in cities that were heavily impacted. Of course, given the small number of votes received by Dupont-Aignan, this effect had no significant influence on the course of the national elections.

**Table T.4:** Treatment intensity

Candidate	Intensity measure	Intensity	Treatment coef.	s.e.	Nb. obs.
Dupont-Aignan	Share of agricultural workers	High	0.576a	(0.139)	30824
		Low	-0.221b	(0.109)	30824
	Share of embargoed exports	High	0.306b	(0.122)	30824
		Low	0.047	(0.140)	30824
	Value of embargoed exports p.c.	High	0.324a	(0.107)	30824
		Low	0.026	(150)	30824
	Drop in total exports	High	0.383a	(0.118)	30824
		Low	-0.030	(0.128)	30824

*Notes:* Each line shows a regression. Coefficients not reported: All regressions include control variables as shown in Table ??; we only report the coefficient on our dummy indicating cities that exported embargoed products to Russian in 2013 and/or 2014. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the employment zone level appear in parentheses. <sup>a</sup>, <sup>b</sup> and <sup>c</sup> indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively. For each intensity measure, in separate regressions, we retain cities with high and low intensity alternately in the treatment group. The control group remains unchanged.

## 4 Comparison of political platforms 2012/2017

Our difference-in-difference analysis requires to match the 2017 candidates to those of 2012. This pairing was based on a careful reading of the candidates’ campaign literature and websites, as well as on reports from opinion polls (e.g. ?).

Obviously, we match Marine Le Pen (2017) with Marine Le Pen (2012), Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (2017) with Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (2012) and Jean-Luc Mélenchon (2017) with Jean-Luc Mélenchon (2012). François Fillon (2017) is matched with Nicolas Sarkozy (2012). Emmanuel Macron (2017) is matched with François Bayrou and 40% of the votes for François Hollande. Benoît Hamon (2017)’s score is paired with an aggregate made of the 2012 votes for Eva Joly from the Green party, and 60% of the ones for François Hollande.

This pairing is legitimately questionable, including for the three candidates present at both



elections, who may have changed their political stances from one election to the next. In an attempt to address this concern, we estimate a lagged dependent variable model, which does not require the matching of candidates (see table ?? in the main text and T.3 above). Alternatively, we exploit here the information collected by the *Manifesto project* to verify the accuracy of our matching.<sup>4</sup>

The idea here is to compare, for each of the political parties that participated in the 2017 presidential election, the political positions expressed at that time with the positions expressed by all French political parties in 2012. Unfortunately, for France, the Manifesto Project only reports analyses of the main parties running in the legislative elections. This is a limitation of the exercise, as there may be significant differences between the programs defended during the presidential and legislative elections.<sup>5</sup> Note however that these differences are limited in France by the fact that legislative elections are held just a few weeks after each presidential election.

Our comparison of policy preferences in 2012 and 2017 is made as follows. We associate each of the main 2017 presidential candidates with their party of affiliation. We then extract from the Manifesto Project data the key indicators of that party's program for the 2017 legislative elections (for Benoît Hamon, who was running in 2017 for both the Socialist Party and the Greens, we take the average of the scores of these two parties). We also take the same indicators of political orientation for each of the main parties present at the 2012 legislative elections. The composite indicators we use are the positions on the following spectrums: Right vs Left; State vs Market (Economy indicator); Conservative vs Progressive (Society indicator); pro- vs anti-EU; and pro- vs anti-Multiculturalism. Then, for each of the 2017 candidates, and each of the indicators, we calculate a proximity index (in absolute value) with each of the 2012 political platforms. These indices are shown in Figure F.4. They have a value of zero when the difference between political stances is maximal and 100 when the scores are of the same value.<sup>6</sup>

This exploration of political programs corroborates our matching choices between 2017 and 2012 candidates.

Notably, the *Front National* program for 2017 is very similar to its 2012 program (cf. panel F.4b). On the left/right scale, the 2017 program is closest to that of the conservative

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<sup>4</sup>Lehmann, et al. , "The Manifesto Data Collection," Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) / Göttingen: Institut für Demokratieforschung (IfDem), 2023.

<sup>5</sup>Also, the political platforms of Dupont-Aignan's party, which has only a handful of deputies, are not examined by the Manifesto Project.

<sup>6</sup>Between 2012 and 2017, the names of some French parties changed. To simplify and clarify the presentation, the figure shows generic names for each of them. The "Conservative" party was Sarkozy's "UMP" in 2012 and Fillon's "Les Républicains" in 2017 ; "Socialist" stands of the Socialist Party (whose 2017 presidential candidate was Benoît Hamon); "Greens" refers to "Europe-Ecologie-Les Verts" (with also Benoît Hamon for 2017 presidential candidate); "Centrist" designates Macron's party "En Marche !" in 2017 and Bayrou's "Modem" in 2012; "Radical Left" stands for Mélenchon's party ("Front de Gauche" in 2012 and "La France Insoumise" in 2017); "Front National" is naturally for Le Pen's party in both years.


party in 2012. But on economic issues, the preference for multiculturalism and European integration, it's the 2012 *Front National* program that most closely resembles the 2017 *Front National* program. The average proximity index, on the 5 dimensions, between the *Front National-2017* and the *Front National-2012* is 88.7. It is followed by the *Conservative-2012* with an average proximity index of just over 64. The greatest distance is with the Greens (*Greens-2012*), for whom the average proximity index is 28.4.

Similarly, we confirm the relevance of matching the votes cast for Mélenchon in 2017 with those he received in 2012 (cf. panel F.4d). On the graph, the line corresponding to *Radical Left - 2012* covers the largest area. The average proximity between *Radical Left-2017* and *Radical Left-2012* is the highest (78.7), above *Greens-2012* with an average index of 62 (the smallest average proximity score is with the *Conservative-2012*: 20.6).


In the same way, we confirm the proximity between Fillon's *Conservative-2017* and Sarkozy's *Conservative-2012* (panel F.4c, with an average proximity index of 89.8). As expected, panel F.4a shows that Macron's *Centrist-2017* is closest to Bayrou's *Centrist-2012* (highest average proximity index of 84) and the *Socialist-2012* (second highest score: 75.3). Similarly, panel F.4e confirms that Hamon's *Socialist and Greens-2017* can be matched with a mix between the *Greens-2012* (highest score: 90.3) and the *Socialist-2012* (second highest score: 84.2).

**Figure F.4:** Comparison of political platforms - 2017 candidates' parties vs 2012 main parties


**(a) E. Macron - *Centrist-2017***




**(b) M. Le Pen - *Front National-2017***




**(c) F. Fillon - *Conservative-2017***



**(d) JL. Mélenchon - *Radical Left-2017***



**(e) B. Hamon - *Socialist and Greens-2017***



*Note:* The figures above show the level of similarity between the party programs of the 2017 candidates, and the 2012 programs of the main French parties (source: Authors' calculation from the Manifesto Project).

## 5 Public positions on Russia taken by the 2017 election candidates

In 2017, The main French newspaper, *Le Monde*, offered on its web edition a comparison of candidates' platforms on a range of key topics. The issue of diplomatic relations with Russia was one of them. We reproduce the classification of candidates proposed by *Le Monde* in table T.5.

**Table T.5:** Candidates to the 2017 presidential election and first round results

Name	Party	Political orientation	Pro-Russia	Results	
				National	Treated
Emmanuel Macron	<i>En Marche!</i>	Center	–	24.0 %	30.1 %
Marine Le Pen	<i>Front National</i>	Far-right	++	21.3 %	11.1 %
François Fillon	<i>Les républicains</i>	Conservative	+	20.1 %	21.9 %
Jean-Luc Mélenchon	<i>La France insoumise</i>	Far-Left	+	19.6 %	21.7 %
Benoît Hamon	<i>Parti Socialiste</i>	Social democrat	–	6.4 %	9.2 %
Nicolas Dupont-Aignan	<i>Debout la France</i>	Conservative/Far-right	++	4.7 %	2.8 %
Jean Lassale	<i>Résistons!</i>	Independent	n.a.	1.2 %	0.7 %
Philippe Poutou	<i>Nouveau parti anticapitaliste</i>	Trotskyist	n.a.	1.1 %	0.9 %
François Asselineau	<i>Union Populaire Républicaine</i>	Independent	+	0.9 %	0.9 %
Nathalie Arthaud	<i>Lutte Ouvrière</i>	Trotskyist	n.a.	0.6 %	0.4 %
Jacques Cheminade	<i>Solidarité et progrès</i>	Independent	+	0.2 %	0.2 %

In addition, we present below some facts and quotes from the 2017 election candidates illustrating their view about Russia and Russia sanctions. The quotes are taken from the candidates' official propaganda, campaign websites or interviews to major French and international medias.

### Marine Le Pen (*Front National*)

Marine Le Pen repeatedly expressed her admiration for Vladimir Putin and called for closer relations with Russia. This pro-Russian stance was made perfectly clear during the 2017 election campaign. Marine Le Pen made numerous public statements to this effect.

“[...] Several of her positions suggest that she would like to see closer relations with Russia. In particular, she expressed her support for a “strategic partnership” to fight against the Islamic State. In addition, she considers that the annexation of Crimea in 2014 is not illegal, which suggests that the sanctions that have been decided by the European Union and the United States against Russia as a result of this annexation are not justified. Marine Le Pen was also invited to the Kremlin by Vladimir Putin during the presidential campaign.”

*Le Monde*, 2017.

“There has been a referendum in Crimea [...] The population has decided, by an overwhelming majority, to return to the bosom of Russia [...] Crimea has

always been Russian. It was given to Ukraine not so long ago by the Soviets. But the population feels Russian.”

Marine Le Pen, *CNN*, Interview, 2017.

“These sanctions are totally stupid. They haven’t solved anything, they’ve just created economic problems for the European Union. They make no sense.”

Marine Le Pen, *CNN*, Interview, 2017.

“The sanctions were decided in 2014, they ruined part of our agricultural sectors and they had no impact in reality on the Russian economy. The only impact they’ve had is on the French economy. So, yes, when it’s not good for France [...] yes, of course, we defend the French.”

Marine Le Pen, *BFM-TV*, Interview, 2017.

### **Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (*Debout la France*)**

Nicolas Dupont-Aignan is politically very close to Marine Le Pen’s National Front. In his 2017 election platform, he explicitly proposed an end to sanctions against Russia, something he has repeated on a number of occasions in interviews.

“Unilateral exit from the sanctions regime against Russia.”

Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, *Official campaign program*, P. 21, 2017.

“Sanctions against Russia must be lifted as a matter of urgency. The Minsk agreements must be enforced, but I note that it is Ukraine that has not complied with them.”

Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, *Radio France Internationale*, interview, 2015.

### **François Fillon (*Les Républicains*)**

François Fillon (“Les républicains”) also had a pro-Russian stand. However, even if this position was likely sincere, it was less marked than for the two far-right candidates. Fillon was the candidate of the mainstream conservative political party, which is significantly different from the populist, illiberal and anti-EU line of Le Pen and Dupont-Aignan. Importantly, Fillon’s personal views on Russia were not widely supported within his party and neither were an official stance of the party. François Fillon was nominated by the leading French conservative party (affiliated with the European People’s Party). This prevented him from openly distancing himself from the positions of France’s diplomatic commitments and those of his main EU partners.

“I want to re-establish dialogue and relations of trust with Russia, which must

once again become a major partner. Together with our European partners, and in compliance with the Minsk agreements, I will initiate to lift the sanctions against Russia, which unfairly penalize our farmers and businesses.”

François Fillon , *Official campaign program* p. 76, 2017.

“Russia is drifting, that’s undeniable, but why is it drifting? Because we originally had the wrong policy towards Russia [...] we pushed Russia away, and imposed sanctions. [...] What did these sanctions lead to? They led to a hardening of Russia’s position. They must be lifted in exchange for a change in Russia’s position. There’s an agreement, there’s a part that has to be respected by the Russian side and a part that has to be respected by the Ukrainian side, for the moment nobody’s respecting anything.”

François Fillon , *Europe 1*, Interview, 2017.

### **Jean-Luc Mélenchon (*La France Insoumise*)**

Jean-Luc Mélenchon (“La France insoumise”) is the only left-wing candidate who showed some pro-Russia stance. But, his opinion was not a definitive and strong support for Russia. Rather, it was mainly motivated by two elements.

First, a vision of international relations marked by Marxism and structuralism, which tends to lead to anti-Americanism and an opposition to interventionism by Western powers. Second, a populist bias leading to a focus on French people’s expectations and a disinterest in diplomatic issues. Mélenchon’s pro-Russian position is more a form of neutrality or indifference than a strong anti-sanctions stance. Mélenchon is thus in line with a tradition of non-alignment of French diplomacy, reinforced by a deep distrust of the United States and a sympathy with ex-communist regimes inherited from the Cold War.

“The Russians are not our enemies but our partners [...] and I don’t want sanctions against the Russians.”

Jean-Luc Mélenchon, *BFM TV*, Interview, 2016.

“I am only interested in the interests of France. And France’s interest is to get along with Russia. The Russians are partners. De Gaulle himself recognized Stalin’s Russia and Mao Zedong’s China.”

Jean-Luc Mélenchon, *France 2*, Interview, 2017.

“Sanctions against Russia make no sense. They are not enforced by the Americans themselves [...]. This policy will not force Russia to do anything. [...] I

don't believe in an aggressive attitude from Russia or China. I know these countries, I know their international strategy and their approach to international relations. Only the Anglo-Saxon world has a vision of international relations based on aggression. Other peoples don't think like that."

Le Figaro, Interview, 2021.

"I am not related in any way to Mr. Putin. I absolutely fight against his policy. And if I were Russian, I would not vote for him." (Twitter, March 29, 2017).

### **Emmanuel Macron (*En Marche* !)**

"Europe has a vocation to get along with Russia. Sanctions exist and will be necessary until the Minsk agreements are respected. We will seek to lift them, if the situation in Ukraine commits us to do so."

Emmanuel Macron, Campaign website, 2017.

### **Benoît Hamon (*Parti Socialiste*)**

"France will remain committed to the United Nations. Far from the unilateralism and brutality outlined by Vladimir Putin's Russia, Xi Jinping's China or Donald Trump's United States, it will defend another vision in Syria, Ukraine, the Sahel and around the world. France will preserve international policies that are in line with our vision of the world, fair and humanistic."

Benoît Hamon, Campaign website, 2017.

"Mr. Putin wants to redraw borders. [...] There were 10,000 deaths in Ukraine. Since when do we bow to the Kremlin and its demands? If France has a Gaullist and Mitterrandian heritage [...], it shall resist Russia's territorial claims. [...] I don't belong to the Kremlin's fraternity."

Benoît Hamon, BFM TV, interview, 2017.

### **François Asselineau and Jacques Cheminade**

François Asselineau and Jacques Cheminade were two minor fringe candidates who both expressed sympathy for Putin's Russia. However, taken together, they barely received 1% of the votes and had a negligible influence on the election.

## **6 List of embargoed products**

**Table T.6:** HS codes banned by the Russian Federation embargo

Code	Simplified description	Code	Simplified description
0201	Meat of bovine animals, fresh or chilled	0202	Meat of bovine animals, frozen
0203	Meat of swine, fresh, chilled or frozen	0207	Meat and edible offal, fresh, chilled or frozen
0210*	Meat and edible offal, salted, in brine, dried or smoked	0301*	Live fish
0302	Fish, fresh or chilled	0303	Fish, frozen
0304	Fish fillets and other fish meat, etc	0305	Fish, dried, salted, smoked or in brine
0306	Crustaceans, etc.	0307	Molluscs, etc.
0308	Other aquatic invertebrates	0401*	Milk and cream
0402*	Milk and cream, concentrated or containing sweetening matter	0403*	Buttermilk, yogurt and other fermented milk and cream
0404*	Whey ; products consisting of natural milk constituents	0405*	Butter and fats derived from milk; dairy spreads
0406*	Cheese and curd	0701*	Potatoes, fresh or chilled
0702	Tomatoes, fresh or chilled	0703*	Onions, leeks and other alliaceous vegetables, fresh or chilled
0704	Cabbages and similar edible brassicas, fresh or chilled	0705	Lettuce and chicory , fresh or chilled
0706	Carrots and similar edible roots, fresh or chilled	0707	Cucumbers and gherkins, fresh or chilled
0708	Leguminous vegetables, fresh or chilled	0709	Other vegetables, fresh or chilled
0710	Vegetables, frozen	0711	Vegetables provisionally preserved
0712*	Dried vegetables, whole, cut, sliced, broken or in powder	0713*	Dried leguminous vegetables, shelled
0714	Manioc, arrowroot and similar roots	0801	Coconuts, Brazil nuts and cashew nuts
0802	Other nuts, fresh or dried	0803	Bananas, including plantains, fresh or dried
0804	Dates, figs, pineapples, avocados, guavas, mangoes	0805	Citrus fruit, fresh or dried
0806	Grapes, fresh or dried	0807	Melons (including watermelons) and papaws (papayas), fresh
0808	Apples, pears and quinces, fresh	0809	Apricots, cherries, peaches, plums and sloes, fresh
0810	Other fruit, fresh	0811	Fruit and nuts, frozen
0813	Fruit and nuts, provisionally preserved	1601	Sausages and similar products, of meat, meat offal or blood
1901*	Malt extract; food preparations of flour, groats, meal, starch or malt extract, etc.	2106*	Food preparations not elsewhere specified or included